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petroleum tax provisions. In our 1973a
paper, we outlined a framework for determining whether the special provisions
were cost effective compared to alternative
policies for increasing investment in petroleum reserves.3 We concluded that it
was impossible to evaluate the policy because there were as yet no reliable estimates of the determinants of investment
in petroleum reserves.
In this paper we present a model of investment in proved reserves in the U.S.
crude petroleum producing industry, and
empirical results for a subsector of that
industry for 1959-71, using estimating
equations derived from the model. The
subsector consists of the five major petroleum producing states which practice
"market-demand prorationing."4 The empirical results indicate that investment in
petroleum reserves depended on three public policies: the special federal tax provisions, state market-demand prorationing, and the federal oil import quota. It is
possible to draw some tentative policy
conclusions from our empirical results, al-

Interest in the determinants of investment in crude oil and natural gas reserves
derives from three sources. First, it is always interesting to find a satisfactory explanation of investment behavior in any
industry. Second, an aspect of the current
concern with the "energy crisis" is the
domestic crude petroleum industry's productive capacity, which is an increasing
function of the stock of proved oil and gas
reserves. Third, there is a decades-old
controversy over the special provisions of
the federal corporation income tax law
which apply to petroleum producers; those
special provisions have traditionally been
justified by an asserted need to increase
investment in petroleum reserves in order
to protect "national security."'
In three previous papers,2 we explored
the running controversy over the special
* Associate professors of econlomics, University of
Massachusetts. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 1973 Winter Meetings of the Econometric
Society. We want to thank Ronald Ehrenberg, Robert
Hall, and James Kindahl for helpful advice and criticism. Valuable programming assistance was provided by
Donald Barnett, Jr. Partial financial support was provided by the Ford Foundation and by the University of
Massachusetts. Neither institution is responsible for the
contents of this paper.
1 The special federal tax provisions for crude petroleum producers are the option to claim "percentage"
rather than "cost" depletion on producing wells, and the
option to expense rather than depreciate so-called "intangible" drilling costs. Compared to uniform tax treatment of corporate income in all industries, the special
provisions for petroleum are a subsidy administered
through the revenue side of the budget. Other mineral
industries may also claim percentage depletion. See
Susan Agria for a detailed discussion of the special tax
provisions for mineral industries.
2 The authors (1973a, b), and Wright.

3 Even a finding that the tax-subsidy policy was costeffective in increasing petroleum reserve investment
would not, of course, necessarily imply that the policy
is "in the public interest," since tradeoffs with other
programs would not be considered. See the authors
(1975a) for a preliminary application of the costeffectiveness approach to evaluating the special tax
provisions.
4 The five states are Kansas, Louisiana, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Texas. According to American Petroleum Institute (API) et al. (1972), they contain about
75 percent of U.S. proved reserves outside Alaska. The
operation of market-demand prorationing is discussed
in detail in Sections I and IV below.
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though a complete analysis of the three
public policies will require additional empirical estimates.
The model is developed in Section I. The
data sources and methodology used to outfit the model for empirical testing are discussed in Section II. The empirical results
are reported in Section III. Finally, Section IV contains the conclusions, including
the policy implications of our results.
I. A Model of the Crude
Petroleum Producer5
We assume that crude petroleum producers maximize the present value of
after-tax cash flow, subject to the constraints of a production function and an
accounting identity. The production function is assumed to be CES. The accounting
identity relates changes in petroleum reserve stocks to flows of gross investment
in reserves and current output ("depreciation").
The after-tax cash flow of a crude petroleum producer is conveniently represented as the difference between a revenue
term and two cost terms, one for investment (reserve acquisition) costs and one
for other input costs. Thus after-tax cash
flow at time t can be written as
(1)
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N(t) = N1(t)

-

N2(t)

-

N3(t)

where N, is the revenue term and N2 and
N3 are the investment and noninvestment
cost terms, respectively. We discuss each
of these cash-flow components in turn.
A crude petroleum producer must make
royalty payments to the landowners from
whom the drilling and production rights
have been leased. These payments are
customarily calculated as a percentage of
5 In constructing the model, we have benefitted from
the earlier work on investment in manufacturing by
Dale Jorgenson (1965, 1967) and by Robert Hall and
Jorgenson. Throughout the present paper, "petroleum"
refers to crude oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids.

gross revenue.6 Let (t -7r) be the proportion of gross revenue which must be paid
in royalty; then the proportion 7r of gross
revenue accrues to the producer. If p is the
price and Q the quantity of marketed output, the revenue of a crude petroleum producer before taxes is 7rpQ.
The after-tax revenue of a crude petroleum producer depends on several tax
provisions. State and local governments
assess production and severance taxes on
both quantity of production and revenue;
these are represented in the after-tax cash
flow equation by the average production
and severance tax rate y. These taxes
are deductible from net income subject to
the federal corporation income tax, which
is assessed at rate u. Further deductions
from federal tax are allowed for a proportion z of gross revenue through the percentage depletion allowance. Together,
the royalty share and the tax provisions
determine the after-tax revenue component of the cash flow equation at time t:
(2)

N1(t)

1 - y(t)

-

u(t)

z(t)] }Ir(t)p(t)Q(t)
Various categories of investment cost in
the crude petroleum industry are treated
differently under the federal corporation
income tax. Define the following terms:
I(t) is total reserve acquisition cost at
time t; qi(I(t), t) is the proportion of I(t)
spent on drilling dry holes; q2(I(t), t) is the
proportion of I(t) spent on "intangible"
costs of successful wells; q3(I(t), t) is the
proportion of I(t) spent on "tangible"
costs of successful wells; and D(t) is the
discounted value at time t of the time
stream of tax deductions from one dollar of
depreciable outlays made at time t. The
three proportions qj sum to one at any
time t.
Dry-hole costs qil and intangible costs
*[1- y(t)

-

6 Stephen McDonald (1963, p. 18), explains how the
royalty payment comes "off the top" before tax liability
is calculated.
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are fully deductible from gross income
q21
in the year in which they are incurred.
Tangible costs q3I must be capitalized and
depreciated over a number of years; therefore the time t value of the tax deductions
they provide is Dq3I. Thus we have the
after-tax investment cost component of
the cash-flow equation at time t:

(3)

N2(t) =

{ [1- U(t)] [ql(I (t),~t) +qf2(I (t) ,t)]
+[1-u(t)D(t)]q3(I(t),

t)}I(t)

Other input cost categories are also
treated differently under the federal corporation income tax. Define the following
terms: L is an index of the quantities of
nonreserve inputs into the production of
crude petroleum; w, is the expensible cost
per unit of L; w2 iS the depreciable cost per
unit of L; and w3 is the nondeductible cost
per unit of L for producers taking percentage depletion rather than cost depletion. Then the noninvestment cost component of the cash-flow equation at time
t is
(4)

N3(t)

+

=

[1-

[1

-

U(t)]wl(t)

u(t) D(t)]w2(t) + w3(t) } L(t)

The quantity of output at time t is constrained by the differentiable implicit production function
(5)

F(Q(t), Q(t), L(t), t) = 0

The variable Q is the full-time equivalent
stock of proved reserves; we specify the
proved reserves input that way instead of
simply as the stock of proved reserves because of market-demand prorationing
(MDP). MDP limits the use of the productive services of proved petroleum reserves.
For example, the Texas Railroad Commission (TRRC) formerly imposed "shutdown
days" on the operation of wells subject to
its control.7 Thus if there had been fifteen
7 In 1963, the TRRC ceased using shutdown days and
began setting "market demand factors" directly in percentage terms, as in statement (6). As the text indicates,
the two regulatory procedures are equivalent.
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shutdown days in a month of thirty days,
the market-demand factor S would have
been
(6)

S=0.5=

30

-

15

If MDP were actually enforced as the
name shutdown days suggests, by shutting
wells down completely part of the time,
the full-time equivalent of a stock of reserves R would be simply SR; the flow of
services from the stock of reserves could
then be assumed proportional to SR. In
fact, MDP is enforced differently; a controlled well is permitted to operate every
day, so long as total output for the month
does not exceed the quantity S times the
"rated allowable" capacity of the well
(which the TRRC also determines). Producers may therefore choose to obtain a
given flow of productive services from
fewer proved reserves than if they were
forced to shut down part of the time; if so,
they will utilize their reserves more intensively than they would under a literal
shutdown days scheme. To include this
possibility, we write Q as the function
(7)

Q(t) = S(t)6R(t),

0 < S(t) < 1,
0 < 0

where 0 is the elasticity of the full-time
equivalent stock of reserves with respect
to the market-demand factor S. A literal
shutdown days scheme would be the special case of (7) where 0 equals 1. If 0 is less
than 1, it would mean that prorationed
producers hold a smaller stock of reserves
for any flow of productive services under
actual MDP than under literal shutdown
days. A value of 0 greater than 1 would
have the opposite implication; this case
seems unlikely, but the actual value of 0 is,
of course, an empirical question.
Gross additions to proved reserves at
time t are represented by the differentiable
function 4(I(t), t). The function 4 is as-
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sumed to be increasing and strictly concave in I (expenditures on acquiring reserves) for all values of t. This representation assumes that at every point in time,
as the size of the reserve acquisition program increases, the marginal addition to
reserves per dollar spent decreases. This
might occur, for example, if the proportion
of "dry holes" increased or if the average
quantity of proved reserves per successful
well diminished.
Let r(t) be the time-rate of change of
the stock of proved reserves, dR(t)/dt.
Then we have the accounting relation
(capital stock equation of motion)
(8)

t

V

dt

N(t)e

where i(s) is the after-tax rate of interest.
The solution to the problem of maximizing
(9), subject to (5), (7), and (8), can be
found by maximizingthe Lagrangianfunction
(10) fg(t)
00

dt

J{N(t)+X(t)F(Q(t),
+i,(t) [(I(t),

t)-Q(t)-r(t)]

S(t)9.R(t), L(t), t)

}

i(s)dst

Substituting (1)-(4) into (10), we find the
Euler necessary conditions to be equations
(5) and (8), plus the following:

OQ(t)
{

-

u(t)

]}Ir(t)p(t)

y(t) -z(t)

OL(t)
I [1

- 0(t)

clOF

Og9(t)

-

OQ(t)

-

-y(t)

[1-

0

(t)-

-=

+

(12)

OF

Og(t)

(11) 0=-

(t)
-

OL(t)

u(t)]wl(t)

+ [1 - u(t)D(t)]w2(t) + w3(t)}
(13)

Og(t)

1(t)

0

-t

O4

_

-

r(t)

[1-u(t)][qj(I(t), t)+q2(1(t) ,

=9g(t)
OR(t)

d

X(t)S(t)y

Oq2 1

OI(QJ
I(t)

Og(t)

dt clr(t)
OF

-

+

D(t) ] dI
a1(t)

+ [1-u(t)
0

Oq
O1(t)

(t)]

-({[1-

(14)

t)]

D(t) ]q3(I(t), t) }

+ [1-u(t)

r(t) = O(I(t), t) -Q(t)

That is, the rate of change of the stock of
proved reserves at time t must equal the
rate of gross additions to reservesat time t
less the rate of output from reserves at
time t.
The assumed objective of a petroleum
producer is maximization of the present
value of after-tax cash flow,
(9)
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a-

+

oa2(t)

dq(t)
dt

-t

-i(t>,(t)

The preceding necessary conditions can
be used to derive the investment functions
implicit in the model. We first derive and
interpret one argument of those functions,
namely, the output-input, after-tax relative price variable. Then we assume a specific form of the production function to
derive the investment functions; their discrete approximations comprise the estimating equations used in the empirical
work.
The first step is to show that the necessary conditions imply that a petroleum producer should set the marginal product of
its stock of reserves equal to the ratio of
the marginal after-tax cost of holding reserves to the marginal after-tax net return from producing reserves. Using equations (5) and (7) and the implicit function
theorem, we find
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aQ(t) = -S(Q0 x(t)OF/9Q(t)
MR(t)

X(t)c1F/c1Q(t)

Equations (11) and (14) imply

(16) -S(t)6 -()F/Q

=

{ 1-y(t)-u(t)

[1-y(t)-z(t)II

The right-hand side of (17) is the inverse
of the output-input, after-tax relative
price variable h, which is shown below to
be an argument of the investment functions:
(18)

X(t)cIF/clQ(t)
i (t) n(t) - 67(t) Idt

h(t)=

[{ 1-Y(t)-u(t)

[1-y(t)-z(t)]}Xr(t)P(t)-r7(t)I

r(t)p(t)-n(t)

FJt\

Equations (15) and (16) imply
'1

aQ(t)
AR(t)

[{ 1-y(t)-u(t)

=

[ {it

1

dq (t)

(t)

dt}

[1-y(t)-Z(t)]
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dn(t7 ,

[dt}
1
t]*

We assume a CES production function,
(19)

Q(t) = Aert{aaQ(t)-v

} r(t)P(t)-7(t)I

The left-hand side of (17) is obviously the
marginal product of the stock of reserves.
We now show that the right-hand side of
(17) is the ratio of the marginal after-tax
net cost of holding reserves to the marginal
after-tax net return from producing reserves. Consider first the numerator. From
(13), we see that q(t) is the marginal aftertax cost of a unit of proved reserves;'
therefore [1/1q(t)] [d-q(t)1dt] is the ownrate of interest on reserves. Since i(t) is the
after-tax monetary rate of interest, the
numerator of the right-hand side of (17) is
the marginal after-tax net cost of holding
a unit of reserves. Next consider the
denominator. The first term {1-y(t)u(t) [1 -y(t) - z(t)] }Iir(t)p(t) is the marginal after-tax revenue from selling a unit of
output. The second term q(t) is the marginal after-tax cost of a unit of reserves to
replace that which is produced. The difference between the two terms is the marginal
after-tax net return from producing a unit
of reserves.
8 Let ,= [(1-u) (ql+q2)+ (1-uD)q ] + [(1-i) (Oq1/dI
+3q2/I)
+ (1 -uD)3q3/dI ]I in equation (13). Note that

,8 is the marginal change in the time t value of after-tax
cash flow with respect to investment expenditure. From
(13), 7 =13(a4vaI)-'. Since ao/aI is the marginal increase
in reserves from investment expenditure, (ad/OI)-1 is
the marginal before-taxcost of reserves; hence 1(aoa/dI) '
is the marginal after-tax cost of reserves at time t.

+

(1 -a)L(t)-v-blv

where A > 0 is the scale parameter; zy: 0 is
the rate of technological change; aC (0, 1)
is the input-intensity parameter; (1+v)-1
E (0, 1 ] is the elasticity of factor substitution, restricted so that both inputs are
necessary for positive production; and
bC (0, 1 ] is the degree of homogeneity, restricted so that the production function is
concave. Equations (7) and (19) imply
that the marginal product of reserves is
RQ(t)-aQ(t)

(20)

aR(t)

aR(t)

aQ(t) (9R(t)

abA-v/b[eIt]-vfb[Q(t)]

(1?vlb) [R(t)]-

(1+v [S(t)]-ev

From equations (17), (18), and (20), we
obtain the following expression for the
optimal stock of proved reserves:
(21)

R(t)

=

[abA-vlb11(1+v)
* [h(t)]I/(?+V)

[Q(t)](b+v)Ib(+1v)

* [S(t)]-O/(1?+)

[eYt]-v1b(1+v)

Taking a logarithmic transformation of
(21) yields the optimal reserves stock
equation

(22) In R(t) = ao + a, In h(t) +
+

a3

In S(t) +

where:
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a2

a4t

In Q(t)

(23)

1
ao

+ v

(27)

[In a + In b]

b(l +v)
+ v

Ov
-

v

-yv
b(l +v)

In Rt = ao + a, In ht +ac
a3

ln Qt

In St + a4t +

Et

Differentiation of (22) yields the proportional net investment equation
dh(t)/dt

dR(t)/dt
R(t)

h(t)
dQ(t)/dt

S(t)
Replacing continuous time by discrete
time in (25), and adding the error term Et,
we get the proportional net investment
estimating equation
AQt

Aht

ARt
+

+a2

a,--

St

Rt
+

a3 -St

+

The only suitable data on reserve acquisition costs which are broken down by
state are those published by the Joint Association Survey (JAS) for "costs of
drilling and equipping wells" (hereafter
D&E costs). These data are available separately for successful oil wells, successful
gas wells, and total dry holes; they appear
to cover the vast bulk of "proving up" outlays. The JAS series on D&E costs is only
available continuously for the years 195971, restricting the empirical estimations to
thirteen observations.9

For the output variable Q, U.S. Bureau

dS(t)/dt

=a4

E'

B. Current Petroleum Output and Price

Q(t)

(26)

+

A. Cost of Acquiring Petroleum Reserves

Replacing continuous time by discrete
time in (22), and adding the error term Et,
we get the reserves stock estimating equation

+

a3A InSt

Iln Qt

In this section, we discuss the selection
and use of empirical measures of the cost of
acquiring proved reserves and of the output and price of crude petroleum. We also
briefly describe the other data used in the
estimations.

b(l + v)

1+

ht + a2

II. Data Sources

b+ v

=

a4 + alAIn

Equation (27) can be derived either by
taking a first-order Taylor series approximation of (22), or by taking first differences in (24).

In A

1

a3

A In Rt =

+

v

-

(24)
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Qt

Et

The net investment estimating equation
with error term Et' is

9 American Petroleum Institute (API) et al., Section
I. The D&E costs include only the "Christmas tree" on
wells to be used in production. The procedures underlying the JAS data have been criticized by Franklin
Fisher; we have not evaluated the data published since
Fisher wrote (i.e., those for 1961-71), but the methodology appears to have been substantially improved (see,
e.g., Morris Adelman, p. 121). JAS published D&E
costs for 1953, 1955, and 1956, but not for 1954 or 1957
and 1958; the early data are of much lower quality than
those for 1959-71. The Chase Manhattan Bank (CMB)
and the JAS (API et al., Section II) publish series on
exploration and development outlays but only for the
entire United States. The CMB series would not be
suitable for econometric work because it is intended as
information for investors, not as a consistently defined
time-series. Moreover, it includes production facilities
beyond the "Christmas tree."
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of Mines (USBM) data were used in constructing a Divisia quantity index'0 of current outputs of oil, natural gas (nonassociated and associated-dissolved), and natural gas liquids-i.e., all petroleum production from which revenue was received.'1
The USBM natural gas figure used in the
output Divisia index was "marketed output," which is equal to "gross" output
from oil and gas wells, less "repressuring"
and "losses."
For the price variable p, a Divisia price
index of oil, natural gas, and natural gas
liquids was constructed. For oil and natural gas liquids, USBM data on values
realized "at the well" (oil) and "at plants"
(natural gas liquids), divided by the appropriate USBM output figure, were used.
For natural gas, the relevant price for decisions on new reserves in year t is the
price obtained on new contracts made in
that year, not average realized prices
which include sales under long-term contracts made in years past; accordingly, a
series for "new contract" prices prepared
by Foster Associates for the Energy Policy
Project was used.

C. OtherData Sources
1) The stock of proved reserves R. Annual data on end-of-year proved reserves
of oil and natural gas, in American Petroleum Institute, American Gas Association, and Canadian Petroleum Association,
were used in a Divisia index of reserves.
2) Market-demand factor S. The values
of this variable were those set by the
TRRC; the annual market-demand factor
was calculated as a percentage equal to the
average of the twelve monthly figures.
3) U.S. corporate income tax rate u.
Data for 1959-69 were obtained from
10 On Divisia quantity and price indexes, see Herman
Wold and Lars Jureen, and Jorgenson and Griliches.
11The USBM data are given in convenient form
through 1969 in API. For 1970 and 1971, the USBM's
Mineral Industry Surveys were used.
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Joseph Pechman, p. 118; the rates for 1970
and 1971 were taken from the U.S. Internal Revenue Code.
4) Percentage depletion rate z. The
statutory percentage depletion rate was
used for want of a time-series of the effective rate; the latter rate would be less than
the former because of the net income
limitation.
5) Average production and severance
tax rate y. This rate was calculated from
data in API et al., Section II, on state and
local taxes paid on oil and gas production,
divided by the total value of petroleum
production.
6) Discounted value at time t of $1 of depreciable cost incurred at time t, D. Iterations from 0.4 to 0.8 in increments of 0.1
showed very little variation in the results.
We used the conservatively high value of
D= 0.8, which is the approximate value
of $1 of depreciable cost over five years
at 12 percent by the sum-of-years-digits
depreciation method (see Hall and Jorgenson).
7) Interest rate i. Two alternative timeseries for the after-tax rate of interest were
used. (a) The quantity (1-u)
times
Moody's index of all "industrial" bond
yields, for thirty-six bonds, referred to as
the "debt" interest rate. (b) The quantity
(1 - u) times the inverse of Standard and
Poor's composite "price-earnings ratio,"
referred to as the "equity" interest rate.
8) Royalty share (1 -7-). Based on information in McDonald (1971, p. 14, and
1963, p. 103, n. 132), we iterated over
values from 0.10 to 0.20. Since the empirical results varied little between iterations,
we follow API et al., Section II, and report
the results for a royalty share of 15 percent.
III. Empirical Estimations
In this section, we first discuss the construction of the relative price variable h
from the data discussed in Section II. We
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then report ordinary least squares estimates of the reserves investment equations
derived in Section I.
The first step in constructing the timeseries of h was to calculate an average-cost
proxy for the marginal after-tax cost of
reserves I defined by (13). To separate
D&E costs on successful wells into intangible (expensible) and tangible (depreciable) components, we regressed intangibles on total D&E costs for successful oil
wells and for successful gas wells, using
JAS data for 1959-64. The total figure for
each type of well was then multiplied by
the fitted slope coefficient and by one
minus the coefficient to obtain intangible
and tangible costs, respectively.'2
The time-series of average costs of acquiring reserves by type of tax treatment
were then obtained by dividing dry-hole,
intangible, and tangible D&E costs by
gross additions to petroleum reserves. Let
A, be a Divisia quantity index of (Rt-RRt,
+Qt) for crude oil and nonassociated
natural gas in year t. Also let Xdt, X,t, and
Xgt be D&E costs in year t on dry holes,
successful crude oil wells, and successful
gas wells, respectively. Finally, let f3 and
da be the estimated proportions of intangibles in D&E costs in year t for successful
oil wells and successful gas wells, respectively. Then for year t the average dryhole cost of new reserves was calculated as
Xdt/At; the average intangible cost of new
and the
reserves was (f3Xct+3gX,t)/At;
average tangible cost of new reserves was
[( 1-0,)X,t+

( 1-0g)Xgt

1A/t.

The last step in calculating the averagecost proxy for the time-series of -j was to
multiply the above dry-hole and intangible
12
The JAS definitions of intangibles and tangibles
correspond closely to those in the federal tax law (e.g.,
API et al., 1964, section 1, pp. 7-8). Scatter diagrams
of intangibles against total D&E costs for successful
wells indicated very tight linear fits for both oil and gas
wells. Least squares regressions gave R2 > 0.999; the
constant terms were not significant.

MARCH 1976

costs by (1 - u) and to multiply the above
tangible costs by (1 - uD). The time-series
of vi in turn was combined with the production-tax rate y, the percentage depletion
rate z, the royalty share ir, the price index
of petroleum production p, and the rate of
interest i, to calculate the time-series of
the output-input, after-tax relative price
variable h, given by (18). There is no time
trend in the time-series of j; the ratio of
the variance to the mean of the series is
less than 0.2 percent. This allowed us to
assume that over the time period covered
by our data, the own-rate of interest on
proved reserves was zero. Consequently,

the term [1/j7(t)
] [dq(t)jdt] was set equal
to zero in calculating the time-series of h.
Market price p is a component of h, and
the quantity of output Q enters the estimating equations as another explanatory
variable. During the period covered by
our data, authorities in the five prorationing states effectively controlled the price
of crude oil through the policy of MDP
(under the protective cover of the import
quota). By varying the market-demand
factor, the state authorities in effect
selected price-quantity pairs from the domestic demand curve. It is therefore appropriate in the following regressions to
assume that market price and output were
both exogenously determined variables
over the period studied.'3
The results of least squares regressions
for the estimating equations derived in
Section I, using the data described in Section II and the procedures detailed above,
are reported in Table 1 (debt interest
rate) and Table 2 (equity interest rate).
Given the small number of degrees of freedom, the results of the least-squares regressions are encouraging. All estimated coefficients of explanatory variables are highly
13 For further explanation of this point, see fn. 17 and
the accompanying discussion in Section IV below.
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TABLE

1-REGRESSION

DEBT INTEREST RATE

RESULTS:

Coefficients

ao

(24) In Rt

4.3423
(2.99)

(26) ARt/Rt

-

(27) Mln Rt

-

ht

Qt

tS
St

acl

a2

as

.0335
(4.18)
.0443
(5.11)
.0379
(4.16)

-.1719
(16.92)
-.1877
(8.62)
-.1699
(7.17)

.8667
(9.40)
.9081
(7.12)
.8488
(5.96)

2

DW

.9734

2.0823

110.7915

.8919

2.1853

31.2575

.8507

2.1009

21.8947

F

a4

-.0275
(7.17)
-.0292
(6.06)
-.0266
(4.84)

Note: Absolute values of I-ratios in parentheses. R2=coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom.
DW= Durbin-Watson statistic; null hypothesis of no serial correlation, DW= 2.0. F= F-statistic; F(4, 8) for equation
(24) and F(3, 8) for equations (26) and (27).
TABLE 2-REGRESSION

RESULTS:

EQUITY INTEREST RATE

Coefficients

ht
ao

(24) In Rt
(26) zRt/Rt
(27) A In Rt

3.6807
(2.55)

al

.0332
(4.06)
.0299
(3.91)
.0297
(3.58)

Qt
a2

.9078
(9.93)
.9644
(6.30)
.9176
(5.91)

St
a3

-.1893
(18.42)
-.1898
(7.10)
-.1789
(6.60)

I2
t

DW

F

.9723

2.4401

106.1457

.8417

2.3299

20.5016

.8185

2.5032

17.5367

a4

-.0295
(7.89)
-.0338
(6.04)
-.0308
(5.32)

Note: See Table 1 for explanation of terms.

significant; moreover, they are quite stable
between the stock and the flow estimating
equations. The W2are relatively high; indeed, we expected worse fits for the firstdifference equations, (26) and (27). The
Durbin-Watson statistics evidence virtually no serial correlation of the residuals
for the debt interest rate and only a weak
tendency towards negative serial correlation with the equity interest rate.'4 The
F-statistics for all six equations estimated
exceed the confidence values at the 1 percent level of significance.
14 Our colleague, Ronald
Ehrenberg, has pointed out
that regardless of the calculated values of the DurbinWatson statistics for the equations estimated, the apparent absence of serially correlated residuals can be
true for only the stock equation or the flow equations
but not for both simultaneously.

The signs of the estimated coefficients
reported in Tables 1 and 2 can be interpreted as follows. For the stock equation (24), producers held a larger stock of
proved reserves during the period studied,
ceteris paribus, (a) the higher was the output-input relative price variable (ai>0);
(b) the higher was the rate of current pe-

troleum output

(a2>

0);

(C)

the smaller

was the market-demand factor (a3 <0);15
15 One might be tempted to think that a more stringent (smaller) value of the market-demand factor would
have reduced the stock of reserves by raising the price
of the effective flow of reserve services into the production of crude petroleum (e.g., Adelman, p. 106). In fact,
producers were forced by the policy of MDP to increase
the reserve/output ratio for any given level of output.
Hence the negative relationship which we find is the
one to be expected.
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TABLE 3-IMPLIED
PARAMETER VALUES:
DEBT INTEREST RATE

TABLE 4

IMPLIED PARAMETER VALUES:
EQUITY INTEREST RATE

Parameters
Equations
(24)ln Rt
(26) ARt/Rt
(27) A In Rt

MARCH 1976

Parameters

1/(1+v)

b

0

y

Equations

1/(1-+v)

b

0

7

.0335
.0443
.0379

1.1599
1.1064
1.1865

.1779
.1964
.1766

.0330
.0338
.0327

(24) In Rt
(26) ARt/Rt
(27) A In Rt

.0332
.0299
.0297

1.1054
1.0381
1.0928

.1958
.1957
.1844

.0337
.0362
.0347

Note: We lack information to solve explicitly for A
(scale parameter) and a (input-intensity parameter);
see (23).

and (d) the lower was the rate of technological change (a4<0). For analogous interpretations of the two flow equations
(26) and (27), add a modifying phrase,
"proportional change in" or "change in,"
where appropriate in the above interpretation of the stock equation.
We report in Tables 3 and 4 the values
of the production function parameters
1/(1+v), b, 6, and y which from (23) are
implied by the estimated coefficients reported in Tables 1 and 2. The estimates of
1/(l+v), which is the elasticity of substitution between reserves and nonreserve
inputs and is equal to the coefficient a1,
are contained in (0, 1 ] as required by our
specification of the production function. In
addition, the values of the elasticity of
substitution are quite small, plausibly suggesting that it is difficult to substitute nonreserve inputs for proved reserves in producing crude petroleum. The estimates of
b, 0, and -y are biased because they are
non-linear functions of the a3. The estimates of b, which is the homogeneity parameter and is equal to (ai-1)/(aj-a2),
are not contained in (0, 1 ] as required by
our specification of the production function. The estimates of 0, which is the elasticity of the full-time equivalent stock of
reserves with respect to the market-demand factor and is equal to a3/(al- 1), are
positive as required by (7); they are also
much smaller than unity, suggesting that
crude petroleum producers in the prora-

Note: See Table 3 for explanation.

tioning sector did indeed respond to MDP
by utilizing their proved reserves more intensively than they would have under
literal "shutdown days" prorationing. Finally, the estimates of ry, which can be
interpreted as the rate of technological
are
a2),
change and is equal to a4/(a,inonnegative as required by our specification of the production function; furthermore, the implied values of 3.3 to 3.6 percent per annum are reasonable.
IV. Conclusions and Policy Implications
Our empirical estimates of the determinants of investment in crude petroleum reserves in the prorationing sector of the
U.S. petroleum industry for 1959-71 are
consistent with the model of investment in
crude petroleum reserves presented in Section I. The results indicate that several
public policies have significantly affected
investment in reserves in the prorationing
sector. Three of the four explanatory variables depend on instruments of government control. The relative price variable
is a function of the special federal corporation income tax provisions for petroleum.
The market-demand factor is under the
direct control of state prorationing authorities. In addition, both those authorities and the federal government exercised
control over crude oil price and quantity
during the period studied, through the
policies of MDP and the oil import quota,
respectively.
Two of the three policies had direct par-
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tial effects on investment in petroleum reserves which can be inferred from our estimates. In addition, all three policies had
indirect partial effects through induced
changes in equilibrium price and quantity,
which can also be inferred from our estimates. The total effects can be determined
from our results if both the direct and the
indirect effects have the same sign; otherwise, further information is required. We
consider first the direct and then the indirect policy effects on petroleum reserves.
The special federal tax provisions for
petroleum corporation income increase the
value of the relative price variable h, given
the price of petroleum output.'6 Thus the
significantly positive estimates of a, imply
that those provisions increased investment
in reserves compared to uniform tax treatment. Similarly, the significant positive
estimates of a3 imply that setting the
market-demand factor S at less than unity
increased investment in reserves compared
to the absence of effective MDP (S= 1).
The oil import quota indirectly affected
investment in prorationing-sector petroleum reserves by restricting the quantity
of imports. Given the market-demand factor and the special tax provisions, reduced
imports would lead to a higher price in the
U.S. market; the higher price in turn
would induce an increase in quantity supplied in the prorationing sector. Therefore,
the significantly positive estimates of a,

and

a2,

the coefficients on relative price

and output, imply that the oil import
quota increased investment in petroleum
reserves.
The indirect effects on petroleum reserves of the special tax provisions and
MDP involve shifts in the petroleum sup16 From (18), h is seen to be an
increasing function of
the rate of percentage depletion z. It can be seen from
(13) that the expensing of intangible drilling costs transfers marginal acquisition costs in the amount [q2+I(aq2
IaI) ] from a term with weight [1 -uD] to a term with
the smaller weight [1-u ].
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ply curve. It can be shown that the model
developed in Section I leads to a prorationing-sector supply function relating
quantity supplied to the market-demand
factor, time, and two output-input relative price variables, our h and another
relative price, which we have not explicitly
defined, for the nonreserve input. In order
to represent the supply function as a
family of supply curves in price-quantity
space, we define the following variable:

(2)c()=(t)

{1y(t)

-u(t) [1 -y(t)- z(t)]

Given the assumption of a zero own-rate
of interest on reserves (see Section III),
statements (18) and (28) imply
(29)
(29)

~P(tW
pc(t)

h
h(t)

i(t)

Then holding constant the price of the nonreserve input and the rate of interest,
quantity supplied in the prorationing sector at time t is an increasing function of p
and S and a decreasing function of c. A
similar argument leads to a supply function for the nonprorationing sector which
is increasing in p and decreasing in c; the
market-demand factor S does not, of
course, appear in the nonprorationingsector supply function. Since total domestic supply is the sum of the quantities
supplied by the two sectors, the total supply function can be represented by the
family of supply curves Q(.) in the pricequantity space of Figure 1.
Let D(p) in Figure 1 be the demand
curve for petroleum in the domestic market. Then suppose that the special tax
provisions were made more generous, so
that c decreased from (say) c" to c'; as a
result, the supply curve would shift from
Q(p, c", S') to Q(p, c', 5'). Given D(p), the
shift in supply would in turn reduce equilibrium price from pb to pa and increase the
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those provisions more generous reduces
the market price. Therefore dpt is negative
and, since a2 is positive, the sign of the indirect effect is the opposite of the sign of
the term in brackets. The latter sign is
analytically indeterminate, depending on
whether aipt/a2ctht is greater or less than
Et. To place limits on the sign of the
bracketed term, we calculated the values

of acPtaj2ctht,usingthe estimatesof a, and
(see Tables 1 and 2) plus the observed
figuresfor pt, h,, and ct for 1959-71;these
valuesvary from0.0366to 0.0659.Therefore the bracketedexpressionin (30) was
negative in each year between 1959 and
1971 in which the price elasticity of demandforcrudepetroleumexceeded0.0659.
If the bracketedexpressionwas negative,
the indirecteffect as a wholewouldhave
been positive, therebyreinforcingthe direct effect.On the assumptionthat Et was
largerthroughoutthe periodthanthe very
low value of 0.0659, we tentatively concludethat both the directand the indirect
effects of the special tax provisionsincreased the stock of proved reservesof
petroleum.
To examinethe indirecteffectof marketon reserves,let us bedemandprorationing
gin with the supply curve Q(p,c', S") in
Figure1. NowsupposeMDP is mademore
stringentby a reductionin the marketdemandfactorfromS" to S'. We showed
above that this reductionwould directly
increasethe stock of petroleumreserves.
There would also be an indirect effect,
however,sincemovingfromS" to S' would
shift the supply curve in Figure 1 from

a2
Qb

QC

Qo

Quonti t y
1

FIGURE

quantity supplied from Qb to Qa. Part of
the increase in quantity supplied would
come from the prorationing sector. Thus
making the special tax provisions more
generous would (ceteris paribus) reduce
market price and increase the quantity
supplied (and vice versa for making the
provisions less generous).
To isolate the indirect effects of varying
the special tax provisions, we take the differential of (22), set dSt and dt equal to
zero, and use (29) to obtain
(30)

dRt

=

-aCp

(Ct) 2ht

dct

E]

+a2Rt [aiPt
+-[

Pt

-

Et]

cx2ctht

dpt

where Et is the price elasticity of demand
for petroleum at time t. The first term on
the right-hand side of (30) is the direct
effect on reserves of changes in the special
tax provisions; since dct is negative, the
sign of this term is positive, which is consistent with our earlier finding that the
direct effect of the special tax provisions
was to increase reserves.
The second expression on the right-hand
side of (30) is the indirect effect on reserves
of changing the special tax provisions. As
noted above in discussing Figure 1, making

Q(p, c', S"') to Q(p, c',

S').17

As a result,

equilibriumprice would increasefrom pc
to pa and total quantity suppliedwould
decrease from Qc to Qa. By reasoning
17 The ability to shift the supply curve in market
price-output space is the reason why effective MDP
enables the prorationing boards to pick points on the
demand curve. Thus, so long as prorationing is effective,
market price and output are exogenous to the prorationing sector producer.
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analogous to that above for the special tax
provisions, the indirect effect of MDP
would be a decrease in reserves, provided
that the price elasticity of demand for
crude petroleum was greater than 0.0659.
Because the direct and indirect effects have
opposite signs in this case, the direction of
the total effect of MDP on petroleum reserves cannot be determined from our estimates alone. Additional information on the
supply and demand functions is required
to determine the net total effect.
The Arab embargo of October 1973 has
prompted interest in the question of national "independence" in oil. Independence
can be defined as having the capacity for
self-sufficiency-that
is, the capability of
being independent of foreign suppliers if
the need arises. It can be promoted
through actual self-sufficiency in production or through holding excess domestic
capacity which can be used in the event
that foreign supplies are disrupted. For a
depletable resource such as petroleum, increasing domestic output in order to pursue self-sufficiency in production in one
period will make it more expensive to be
self-sufficient or to hold excess capacity in
later periods. In contrast, a policy which
promotes independence by inducing domestic producers to hold excess capacity
need not mortgage future independence by
increasing the present rate of depletion of
the resource.'8
An interesting question is whether past
public policies have contributed to or detracted from national independence in oil.
Proponents of those policies have claimed
that they promoted a "strong petroleum
industry" and thus increased "national
security." Our empirical estimates permit
us to shed some light on this question. In
what follows, we analyze the effects of
past policies on self-sufficiency as measured
by the quantity of imports; discussion of
18 These points are fully explained in the authors'
paper, 1975b.

165

policy effects on alternative measures of
self-sufficiency is relegated to footnotes.
We also analyze the effects of past policies
on independence as measured by the ratio
of imports to domestic proved reserves; because reserves are a measure of productive
capacity, this ratio is one index of the
capability of the domestic petroleum industry to replace imports.
We saw above that, ceteris paribus,'9 the
indirect effects of the special petroleum
tax provisions were transmitted in part
through an increase in domestic quantity
supplied. Given that the oil import quota
was administered by limiting imports to
a fixed percentage of domestic production,20 the increase in domestic production
led to an increase in the quantity of imports. Thus the special tax provisions
tended to reduce self-sufficiency in oil during the period 1959-71.21 In addition, the
increased domestic production caused the
faster depletion of domestic petroleum resources; hence the existence of the special
tax provisions in the past has made the
present pursuit of independence more
costly. Finally, we saw above that the total
effect of the special tax provisions was
probably to increase investment in proved
reserves. Since those provisions also increased imports, we cannot determine their
net effect on past independence in oil as
19 All changes and effects discussed below are partial
ones.
20 James Burrows and Thomas Domencich, p. 12;
Cabinet Task Force, p. 10. There was a gradual accumulation of exceptions to this policy criterion but they are
irrelevant to an analysis of partial effects.
21 Other measures of self-sufficiency are the ratio of
imports to domestic production Qm/QdI,and the ratio of
imports to total domestic quantity demanded Qm/D.
Given the wav the import quota was administered, the
first measure Qm/Qd could not be changed by any other
petroleum policy. Because the special tax provisions increased both Qm and D, the second measure Q,,/D would
have varied with tax policy; unfortunately, our estimates do not enable us to calculate the relative magnitudes of the two increases. Note that a different administration of the oil import quota would have led to other
conclusions about tax policy effects on the several
measures of self-sufficiency and independence.
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measured by the ratio of imports to proved
reserves.
As we showed above, the policy of
market-demand prorationing (MDP) reduced domestic petroleum production.
Given the way the import quota was enforced, MDP therefore reduced oil imports
and thereby increased past energy selfsufficiency.22 Because the direct effect of
MDP on reserves was positive but the indirect effect was negative between 1959
and 1971, we cannot determine the net
effect of MDP on past independence in oil
as measured by the ratio of imports to reserves. We can say, however, that past
MDP made the present pursuit of independence less costly because the lower rate
of petroleum production reduced the rate
of depletion of domestic petroleum resources. 23
The oil import quota, of course, reduced
the quantity of imports compared to a
policy of free trade in oil; thus it increased
past self-sufficiency in oil.24 In addition,
we found that the quota indirectly increased investment in proved reserves by
raising the market price of petroleum. The
combination of lower imports and greater
reserves means that the quota increased
past independence in oil as measured by
the ratio of imports to reserves. The increased market price, however, led to
larger domestic production and hence
faster depletion of domestic petroleum resources. The oil import quota of the past
22 Using the alternative measure Qm/D, the
effect of
prorationing on self-sufficiency is qualitatively indeterminate, since both components of the ratio would be
reduced.
23 We abstract here from the considerable inefficiencies
due largely to overdrilling and favoritism towards
"stripper" wells, introduced by MDP when it was an
effective policy; see Adelman.
24 The quota unambiguously increased self-sufficiencv
according to the alternative measure Qm/Qd, since the
numerator was reduced and the denominator was increased. According to the measure Qm/D, however, the
effect is ambiguous, since both components were reduced
(domestic quantity demanded was reduced by the
higher market price caused by the quota).
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therefore made the pursuit of present independence more expensive.
A lesson in the importance of evaluating
related public policies simultaneously rather than in isolation from one another is
provided by the interaction between the
import quota and the special petroleum
tax provisions. The quota was ostensibly
intended to promote self-sufficiency in oil.
We saw above, however, that the special
tax provisions in the presence of the quota
tended to reduce self-sufficiency in oil during the period 1959-71 by increasing the
quantity of imports. Ironically, had there
been no import quota, the special tax provisions would have reduced oil imports,25
thereby increasing self-sufficiency. Furthermore, without the quota the special
tax provisions would have increased past
independence in oil, in that the increase in
reserves coupled with the reduction in imports would have decreased the importreserve ratio. With the quota, in contrast,
both the numerator and the denominator
of the ratio were increased, leaving the
effect on independence indeterminate.
In conclusion, we wish to stress two implications of the preceding discussion of
independence in oil. First, in evaluating a
particular petroleum policy, one must take
into account possible interactions with
other policies; we found, for example, that
the effects of the special tax provisions on
self-sufficiency would have been reversed,
had the oil import quota not existed. Second, our analysis reveals that past policies,
contrary to assertions by their proponents,
did not unambiguously promote national
25 If the supply curve of imports was horizontal and
(in the absence of an import quota) constituted the
controlling marginal supply price in the domestic market, the increase in domestic supply resulting from more
generous federal tax treatment would mean larger domestic production and hence fewer imports, since the
total quantity demanded would not change. For an upward-sloping import supply curve, the increase in domestic supply would reduce the market price and hence
also reduce the quantity of imports supplied in the
market.
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independence in oil. In designing future
petroleum policies, then, attention should
be paid to achieving consistency among
different policies. Moreover, public officials would do well to explore alternative
sets of policies which may dominate the
past set in the sense of offering (say) a
lower-cost time path for national independence in oil (see, for example, the
authors, 1975b).
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